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HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY: FUTURE PROSPECTS*
Erdwin H. Pfuhl, Jr.
Arizona State University
ABSTRACT
The present paper focuses on several prominent
organizational and ideological aspects of academic
criminology and the criminal justice system in an
effort to assess the prospects of developing a
criminology that is informed by humanistic concerns.
The conclusion is that, for the immediate future, the
prospects are minimal.
INTRODUCTION
Before considering the future prospects for
humanistic criminology, the terms humanism and
criminology need defining. Though humanism has meant
many things to many people, its unifying thread is a
concern for the worth, dignity, rights,
responsibilities and fulfillment of the person
(Cheyney, 1932; Schiller, 1932; Sutich and Vich,
1969:8) and relevant social reforms. The following
pages concern the prospects of creating a criminology
that is consistent with these matters.
While, for most people, criminology is a body of
special knowledge or an academic discipline, it is
regarded here as a process consisting of the
* I would like to thank David L. Altheide, Ronald A.
Hardert, John H. Johnson, and Richard H. Nagasawa
for their comments on earlier versions of this
paper.
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activities of representatives of the criminal justice
system, with academic criminology constituting only
one element in the larger whole. This perspective is
intended neither to trivialize academic criminology
nor to ignore its relationship with applied
criminology. Rather, this definition accords with my
belief that a vital humanistic criminology calls for
humanistic principles to give form to the
institutionalized activity that impacts most directly
on people's lives. In short, this definition affords
a means of focusing on humanistic tendencies where
they matter most--in the affairs of everyday life.
With these two definitions in mind, let's
consider the current condition of the criminological
enterprise relative to embracing a humanistic
perspective, giving special attention to its
ideological and organizational features.
HUMANISM IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGY
Though academic humanism has a long and
distinguished history (Lee, 1973; Goodwin, 1983), its
concerns and perspectives are manifest in the
crimin~logical enterprise only in a relatively minor
sense. Evidence of this is found in both practical
crime control policy as well as academic criminology.
Comments on both are in order.
Crime Control Policy
We begin by noting that the practicalities of
operating the crime control apparatus are the
responsibility of a relatively small cadre of people.
As a collectivity, these functionaries are hardly
unique. Overall, they are ordinary human beings and
may be expected to behave accordingly. This suggests
that the majority of these practitioners have likely
internalized prevailing (official) models of humankind
and society, as well as "taken-for-granted"
605
explanations of behavior that inform the activities of
the crime control establishment and popular ideas
regarding the "crime problem." In short, their work
is likely to reflect the current orthodoxy.
Thus, it is plausible to suggest the bulk of
crime control practitioners pose no significant
challenge either to the processes engaged in or to the
philosophical/ideological stuff by which they are
rationalized. That is, few criminc ogists are
inclined to engage in a genuinely radical or creative
examination of the social reality used to make sense
of their activities. Among the reasons for this is
that official reality is subject to constant
reinforcement in the course of daily professional
activity. A reluctance to engage in critical
appraisal is further reinforced by the expertise and
authority claimed by and granted to practitioners, as
well as the tendency for personnel to legitimate their
work on the basis of the practical necessities and
organizational imperatives. An example may serve to
make the point.
As shown by Shover's (1984) research, novice
corrections workers are subject to rather systematic
socialization by older workers, through whom they are
introduced to work routines, given examples of how
reports on inmates are to be written, and learn what
kinds of information about offenders is and is not
considered useful and important. Differences between
the work of the novice and the veteran are resolved in
favor of the veteran. Pertinent to our present
concern is that novices soon learn that the reports
they write about prisoners serve primarily to
rationalize policy decisions made on the grounds of
what is regarded as necessary to promote the smooth
and efficient operation of the organization. Reports
are largely irrelevant to "treatment" or
"rehabilitation." Shover notes, "what they write
about convicts seems to be much less important than
merely writing something. So long as they generate
reports that satisfy the organizational need for a
justification of the convict's presence in prison,
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their work is evaluated as satisfactory" (1984:71;
italics in original).
Realization of this fact by workers is often
followed by disillusionment, a decline in their faith
in the utility of the system, and a sense of cynicism
concerning the profession and its practitioners. Many
leave the corrections field to avoid being "trapped."
Others find it necessary to accommodate to and accept
the status quo. Thus, among those who remain in the
profession there exists a reluctant acceptance of
current orthodoxy overlaid with marked cynicism, the
same sort of cynicism that has been found among police
(Niederhoffer, 1967), probation officers (Blumberg,
1967), and public defenders (Sudnow, 1965). In each
instance there is a realization that the "service
ideal" and client needs are subordinate to
organizational needs. At best, then, the development
of a genuine professionalism is problematic; so, too,
is the likelihood of a critical and humanistic
orientation.
Related to this is the major organizational
feature of the criminological enterprise, viz., its
bureaucratic nature. Accordingly, agencies within the
system display a hierarchical ordering of personnel
who rely on formal rules and regulations (a "theory"
of office) to govern relations with clients and solve
problems. By definition, personnel are arranged in
layers, each layer's occupants being informed by a
somewhat different reality, with no one in a position
either to acquire a valid comprehension of the system
as a whole or to influence the system so as to effect
a significant change in modus operandi. Moreover,
given a reliance on formal rules and regulations for
guidance, gersonnel are encouraged (in many instances,
pressured) to deal with clients only in terms of
their identity as rule breakers. Again, in contrast
to dealing with persons, functionaries deal with cases
according to organizational guidelines (Sudnow, 1965;
Lundman, 1980:20; Shover, 1984). Cases are devoid of
personal and idiosyncratic features; the human
elements are systematically ignored in favor of their
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typical features. Routinization promotes organiza-
tional goals at the expense of the personal needs and
interests of the client population. In short,
bureaucracies dehumanize.
It seems, then, that a gulf exists between
everyday affairs of crime control agencies and their
official raison d'etre. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore
the alleged trend toward humanizing law enforcement
practices in this country, especially in the
disposition of offenders and the reduction in the
harshness of penalties. However, the long term
changes that have occurred can hardly be the basis for
satisfaction since they are no more than mere
tokenism. They have been a long time coming, are far
from securely established, and do not satisfy the
essential meaning of humanism. While most of the
repugnant and beastly methods of punishment of prior
times have been suspended, the present age has its own
forms of structural violence, brutalization (including
sexual exploitation), and psychological, economic and
social victimization (Sykes, 1958; Wicker, 1975;
Foucault, 1977; Bowker, 1980; Lockwood, 1980; Wooden
and Parker, 1982; Hardert, et al, 1984:21). Further
the reinstitution of capital punishment and the
insistent call for more certain and severe penalties
(e.g., the new classicism of van den Haag and Wilson)
in the name of deterrence by incapacitation, as well
as the current increase in prison populations reflect
"part of a general trend toward punishment"
(Sutherland and Cressey, 1978:653; emphasis added) and
suggest how tenuous any "progress" toward humanism has
been. Despite the lack of evidence supporting the
efficacy of punishment or a policy of selective
incapacitation (Greenwood, 1982, 1984; von Hirsch,
1984), we continue to sentence a higher proportion of
our citizenry to prison for characteristically longer
periods than other industrialized nations. Far from
the sanitized places sometimes portrayed in fiction
and the media, prisons continue to be places that
impose random and unpredictable vengeance on inmates
and often "discharge bitter, mangled men bent on
revenge" (McCoy, 1981:193). Further, arguments
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supporting punitive policies, e.g., van den Haag's
(1975:56-58) mechanistic, cost-benefit ratio approach
to punishment and crime control (Jeremy Bentham in
modern dress?), are simply the most recent attempt to
legitimate standard crime control methods. This
suggests the crime control enterprise is
dehumanized--out of touch with those it was intended
to understand and serve. The economic calculus
advocated by van den Haag and others suffers from the
elimination of the human factor (Schumacher, 1973:74).
A non-humanistic orientation is also found in the
definition of the justice system contained in the
still relevant report of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, viz.,
that it is the "apparatus for apprehending,
prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing those who
violate the basic rules of group existence" (1967:7).
In short, the justice system consists of a series of
bureaucratic procedures having little or no
relationship to justice or to humanism. However, the
virtue of that definition is its descriptive validity
and its reference to a pervasive and stubborn
condition. Carried out under the aegis of "total
institutions" (Goffman, 1961), arrest, detention,
arraignment, pleading, sentencing, and imprisonment
tend to be dehumanizing and brutalizing experiences
having little or no discernible relationship to long
term individual or community benefits. Ajudicative
processes seem to be designed for the registry of ever
larger numbers of people, usually the poor and
minorities (Reiman, 1979; N.Y. Times, 4/9/84). The
callous and indifferent routinization of everyday
procedures in these agencies is consistent with the
belief that their success is measured by numbers of
cases handled rather than by the quality of service
provided (Waegel, 1981). In short, such agencies
ignore the human condition; at worst they promote its
deterioration.
In characterizing the criminological enterprise
as dehumanized, I am not unaware of specific instances
that reflect genuine humanistic concerns. However,
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most of these instances seem to be exceptions proving
the rule or cases of "business as usual" overlaid with
humanistic sounding euphemisms that lead people to
misperceive. We are in a period when images count for
more than substance, when sanitized terminology and
the skillful use of money, media, and information
control are used to legitimate public policy (Mueller,
1975; Hardert, et al, 1984:392-393). When the "hole"
is replaced by "quiet rooms" or "meditation rooms,"
and when "bad asses" are replaced by people with
"attitude problems" the public is led to believe
something substantive has occurred. Such euphemisms
divert criticism by masking dehumanizing procedures
and lending legitimacy to the justice system, but more
with an eye for the administration of justice than the
justice of administration.
The use of language and other symbols to
"sanitize" is seen in the case of New York City where
the remodeled Tombs prison displays circus colors,
molded plastic chairs, neon lights, gymnasia and other
aspects of a "state of the art" jail (N.Y. Times,
10/17/83:1 and 12). However, simultaneously with the
opening of the remodeled Tombs came the story of a 21
year old "child of bureaucracy" who, though
acknowledged to be mentally retarded and a victim of a
system that "shelters and feeds" but does not
"confront [client's] problems or prepare them for
life," was sentenced by the New York court to 1 to 4
years in prison for burglary. This, despite the court
acknowledging that the man's troubles are very much a
consequence of the defects of a foster home care
system in which he spent his entire life after age 5
months (N.Y. Times, 10/17/83:12; 10/20/83:17). These
examples reflect the pursuit of short run superficial
innovation rather than long-run substantive change,
the sacrifice of people issues for the sake of
appearances, and the primacy of the state's intent
only to punish and control.
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Academic Criminology
A similar lack of humanism seems to characterize
academic criminology. Despite the intellectual
ferment of the late 1960's and most of the 1970's,
(Friedrichs, 1970; Gouldner, 1970), relatively little
has occurred to suggest sociology (including academic
criminology) has moved far from its traditional
orientation, or that a radical, critical, or
humanistic criminology is more than a minority view.
Evidence for this allegation is found in
criminologists' writings dealing with the purpose and
goal of their discipline. A brief, non-random
examination of 12 general criminology textbooks in
print revealed only two (Galliher and McCartney, 1977
and Hartjen, 1978) that refer to humanism as either a
fundamental concern of academic criminology or a
matter of relevance to the criminal justice system.
Certainly, the general absence of a humanistic concern
may mean many things, and we may not assume its
omission reflects a lack of appreciation for the
humanist perspective. At the very least, however, one
may assume the bulk of these authors did not find the
matter to be sufficiently central to warrant more than
brief consideration.
These texts also were examined to determine if
authors regard reform of the human condition (defined
in terms other than simply controlling crime) to be
one of criminology's goals. One author (Sykes,
1978:6) makes indirect reference to humanistic
concerns by considering the prevention of crime via
environmental modification; another refers to the
reduction of pain and suffering in the world as a
practical objective of criminology, a goal defined as
comparable to the provision of "good medical care,
good nutrition, and decent housing for all"
(Sutherland and Cressey, 1978:24). Finally,
Sutherland and Cressey note that compiling evidence
supporting the wisdom of decriminalizing some crimes
is a concrete way criminologists may work to reduce
pain and suffering of offenders who broke laws
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prohibiting participation in widespread, largely
innocuous pleasures. Again, only Galliher and
McCartney (1977) and Hartjen (1978) consider the
discipline's potential for promoting broad social
ideals or implementing the principles of humanism.
This is not to say these texts entirely ignore
the radical, Marxist, critical, or humanist
orientations. Exclusive of the Galliher and McCartney
and Hartjen texts, the works examined devote some
space (ranging from three paragraphs to about 14
pages) to these perspectives. However, though
discussed, these perspectives tend to be portrayed as
variants of conflict sociology, possibly another
"fad", and lacking precision and conceptual
sophistication (Sykes, 1978:21). At best, humanist
orientations tend to be treated with reserve; at
worst, they are seen as simply irrelevant.
Criminology as Organization
An appreciation of the preceding comments
requires consideration of one final element shared by
the criminal justice and academic branches of the
criminological enterprise. Specifically, criminology
is a publicly financed enterprise, consisting either
of departments/agencies within the criminal justice
system or, in academe, of publicly supported
teaching/research units. In an important sense these
units operate as interest groups and may be expected
to give first priority to their organizational
welfare. The question arises, then, how may a vital
humanistic criminology arise and flower among agencies
whose survival depends on satisfying the expectation
that their operation be consistent with existing
social arrangements, prevailing constructions of
meaning, the interests of dominant power groups, etc.?
How shall the output and activity of these agencies be
rendered more humanistic in the face of bureaucratic
and dehumanizing pressures?
The implications of public dependency for
elements of the criminal justice system parallel
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Norman Goroff's (1982:409) suggestion about social
work and social workers, viz., the enterprise and its
functionaries are properly described as political in
that they are representatives of the state and dare
not run counter to Leviathan's wishes. The fate of
those who do is seen in the case of the Community
Legal Services and the Legal Services Corporation as
well as President Reagan's efforts to reconstitute the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission as a result of Commission
member's criticizing his policies concerning blacks,
women and Hispanics (N.Y. Times, 10/26/83:2).
Underlying this condition is a fundamental
organizational operating principle, viz., maximize
rewards and minimize strains. Whether in the justice
system or elsewhere, that principle can have a
chilling effect on fundamental procedural innovations.
Related to this is the situation faced by
academics, viz., the opportunity to satisfy the
expectation to do research and publish is to some
degree dependent on the orthodoxy of one's material.
For researchers, there is the problem of securing
funds for projects that are independent of (not to say
in conflict with) the orientation of funding agencies.
Who would contest the idea that such agencies at
present are principally governmental? Further,
publishers and journal editors commonly define
acceptable stuff as that which has a potential for
attracting a substantial segment of an already crowded
market. Rarely does this include the unorthodox. A
result is that perspectives such as the humanistic are
less likely to find acceptance because they reflect
neither a popular model of humankind or society nor
the official definitions of crime.
It is at this point that we note a fundamental
"flaw" in contemporary academic criminology and the
public policy for which it serves as apologist.
Specifically, I refer to the positivist/empiricist
orientation dominant in academic and practical
criminology during this century and its accompanying
consciousness.
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Among the implications of this orientation is
that the bulk of academic criminology concerns itself
with the question of "why people commit crime", a
question reflecting the taken-for-granted assumptions
that: crime is an objective condition; that some
people do not commit crime; that a substantively
meaningful distinction can be made between the
supposedly real categories of offenders and
non-offenders; and that, once they are differentiated
from others, offenders can be studied in terms of the
impersonal forces (social and otherwise) that lead
them behave differently. It is assumed that when
these forces are identified, he problem of crime can
be brought under control. Commitment to this
orientation runs so deep that even the mountain of
fruitless data compiled by positivists seem incapable
of promoting substantial change.
This steadfastness reveals another facet of
positivism. Specifically, I refer to the
consciousness promoted by positivist empiricism, a
consciousness leading to greater emphasis being placed
on epistemological than ontological concerns, that
seems to attach more importance to methodological than
to substantive matters, and that assigns more
importance to reliability than validity. As a
result, there is a tendency to ignore the idea that
the questions being pursued could be vacuous.
Instead, it is taken as an article of faith that if
"answers" are unsatisfactory it is due to faulty
methods rather than faulty questions. Thus, orthodox
criminology tends to persist in its concern over
deterministic explanations of criminal behavior, is
more concerned with "the crime problem" than with "the
problem of crime," and is less than fully attentive to
the relationship between the latter and the social
order (Michalowski, 1985:4ff).7
As such, mainstream academic criminology seems
more interested in the manipulation of variables and
second order constructs than in grappling with the
pluralistic world people experience. As Otto Larsen
has noted, "the failure [of academics] can often be
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attributed to an obsession with abstract concepts that
leads to a masking of the social experience that
[they] are attempting to comprehend" (1976:ix).
Downes and Rock also propose that "sociologists who
lean on external accounts and objective evidence can
have no appreciation of why people act. Neither can
they apprehend environments and history as their
subjects do. They are imposing an alien explanation
whose links with a problem are a little tendentious"
(1982:37). The price of that obsession with a world
of abstractions is the sacrifice of the opportunity to
implement a genuinely grounded, existential and
humanistic perspective.
In summary, most criminologists, it seems, are
guided by assumptions that ignore the element of human
agency and that are the antithesis of a humanistic
perspective. Overall, rather than promoting greater
sensitivity to or understanding of humankind, these
guiding and unquestioned assumptions sustain a
dehumanizing public policy as well as an academic
orientation that largely fails to appreciate law and
crime as products of the myriad contradictions and
conflicts, the dialectic, of a complex society.
CHANGES AND THEIR PROSPECTS
The preceding remarks suggest that a turn toward
humanism requires change in the conceptual stuff of
orthodox academic criminology as well as in the
standard, taken-for-granted understandings underlying
the functions of the criminal justice system. Let's
talk of specifics. Regarding perspectives on
crime/criminals, a humanistic orientation would
require the adoption of markedly different
perspectives than now prevail. As one example, Tifft
(1979:382ff) suggests that current ideas concerning
crime rest on the principle of legality and rely on
the legal to protect against appropriation of human or
extra human resources. By definition, a humanistic
orientation would require abandoning the principle of
legality for that of justice, and adopting a
perspective that defines crime retrospectively rather
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than prospectively as at present. That is, from a
humanistic perspective, what is fair and just, might
best be defined after the fact rather than before. To
be sure, since defining specific events as crime is
always a matter of classifying acts after they have
occurred, the application of law is a retrospective
exercise. But Tifft is suggesting something more; to
the degree the prevailing system of prospective
legality supports a hierarchical and stratified system
that is, by and large, advantageous to a select and
powerful segment of the population, and because
prospective legality is inclined to defend property
rights in preference to human needs, that system would
have to be dismantled in order to establish a just and
humanistic criminology. Yet, because the bulk of
practicing criminologists identify with the prevailing
system, the prospect for change in the near future
appears to be somewhere between nil and zero.
Another needed change is abandonment of the
tendency to define expert knowledge as inherently
superior, more revealing and more valid than lay
knowledge. Such change would simultaneously call for
abandoning the tendency to allow expert knowledge to
be shaped by and subordinate to conventional research
methods. The imbalance favoring hard positivism and
empiricism needs to be corrected in favor of greater
reliance on field methods and ethnographic types of
research (following the course suggested by such
scholars as Polsky (1967), Denfeld (1974), Warren
(1974), Weppner (1978) and others. In turn, this
might serve to expand our appreciation of the complex,
morally pluralistic society we live in, and provide a
more secure place in academic criminology for
perspectives other than those reflecting a spurious
morality -- sometimes referred to as the dominant or
public morality. If humanism is to mean anything,
scholars must be free and open to impartial
consideration and use of alternative perspectives,
techniques, and programs. In the academic there must
be renewed effort to Avoid positions best
characterized as doctrinaire. Yet, as sure as I am
of the need for such changes, I am equally skeptical
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of many criminologist's willingness to accept them.
One need only note the resistance to acknowledging the
general validity and meaningfulness of the labeling
perspective (Gove, 1980). The dominion of orthodoxy
must be overcome and replaced by an acknowledgement of
the multiplicity of social realities and an awareness
that even the interpretations of criminologists are
mere social constructions. Criminologists might
benefit by modeling themselves after the Dancing Wu Li
Masters (Zukav, 1979).
Related to the foregoing are a number of
seemingly mundane but critical issues. For example,
how realistic is it to anticipate a significant
alteration in people's beliefs about the status quo
when they feel they have a stake in its maintenance?
How shall we dissuade people from identifying with the
purpose and operation of agencies from which they
believe they derive benefit? How shall we dissuade
people from embracing and legitimizing the definitions
and constructions of reality they use to make sense of
their world and from which they believe they derive
satisfaction? The point of such questions is that the
various agencies of the criminal justice system and
the ideological stuff that gives them legitimacy are
things with which many people identify and to which
they assign great importance. lo be sure, some people
are extremely dissatisfied and disenchanted with
certain aspects of the operation of the system, as
well as with the work of the highest office holders in
the nation. They also may be terribly ill-informed
about the workings of the system (Arizona Republic,
10/22/83:A-1). However, dissatisfaction, disenchant-
ment and ignorance may not equated with a readiness
for radical change. Certainly, the past few decades
have witnessed shifts in values and ideas concerning
the general matter of doing justice. One is reminded
of the ferment linked with the counterculture of the
1960's and 1970's, including its skepticism about
crime, criminality, and the administration of law.
Just as it would be easy to overemphasize the
practical impact of that ferment, so too would it be
unrealistic to anticipate early or significant revi-
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sion of the basics of the criminological enterprise.
But there is more.
A vital humanistic criminology must be responsive
to human needs and, consequently, might best be linked
to a sociology of human rights (Hartjen, 1978; Young,
1981, 1984a, and 1984b). While I am sympathetic to
such a criminology, I suggest that its appeal, to some
degree, likely rests on its generality. However,
because a meaningful criminology must at some point
get down to details, let's turn to some specific
questions that a few criminologists have raised but
that none seem to have resolved.
For example, if the expansion of human rights is
the goal of a humanistic criminology, what rights are
being considered, and to whom shall these rights be
granted? Second, how shall the extension of these
rights be secured and maintained? Concerning the
first question, Hartjen (1978:226) suggests a
humanistic criminology would be concerned with
securing freedom from tyranny, repression, and
oppression, whatever their form or source. Again, I
am surely in favor of such things. But I also
recognize that we exist in an incredibly pluralistic
society wherein power shifts constantly (Wrong, 1968
and 1979). For very practical reasons, then, it is
probable that at some point realization of one group's
sense of right and justice will lead others to
experience conditions they perceive as threatening,
frightening, etc. Since "one man's meat is another
man's poison," whose definition shall prevail? Whose
rights shall take precedence? And, when rights are
seen as mutually exclusive, on what grounds shall one
set be given priority over another? It seems
inevitable that in a morally pluralistic society such
questions always will persist and that their
resolution undoubtedly will result in some measure of
perceived misery. The pursuit of abstractions will
not suffice to resolve the dilemma.
As to the second question, because the state
rests on an organized interest structure and is an
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interest group in its own right, it does little good
to assign the responsibility for attending to these
matters to that entity. Surely, no one with an
awareness of history can realistically regard the
state as a dependable guardian of human rights. As
Platt has noted (1969), the state has been far less
concerned with protecting the victims of dehumanizing
conditions than with protecting society from their
anticipated depredations. How shall we assure that
human rights will be granted to representatives of all
groups, recognizing that the assignment of respect and
contempt are indeterminate and shifting conditions? A
simple case in point is the criticism heaped on the
American Civil Liberties Union for trying to safeguard
the constitutionally guaranteed rights of unpopular
groups. In short, if among the fundamental rights to
be secured is the "right to be different," we seem
eons away from its realization.
More, if the state's record in defense of human
rights is less than encouraging, on whom or what shall
we rely to resolve these basic issues? Hartjen has
proposed that "the definition of what constitutes
fundamental human rights is for the individual to
decide [and their pursuit should be] left to the
marketplace of conflicting ideologies" (1978:226).
Unless I completely misunderstand, that is an
invitation to perpetuate the very condition humanists
seek to eliminate, i.e., a condition in which
conflicting, often mutually exclusive interests
compete with one another for legitimation in law.
Given our system of doing justice, that competition
invariably ends to the advantage of one and detriment
of the other.
Another way to address this basic issue is
suggested by Chambliss and Seidman (1982). In our
society, formal legal dispute settlement most often
follows a pattern characterized as "winner-takes-all,"
a pattern rooted in a society in which disputants are
so dissociated from one another as to be unconcerned
with any lasting sense of antagonism or feelings of
injustice by one of the parties. Contrasting with
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that is a dispute settling method called "give-a-
little, get a little," a method found in societies
"where parties want or must have continuing
interactions of a non-antagonistic nature after the
dispute [and] must leave the dispute-settlement
procedures without too great a sense of grievance"
(Chambliss and Seidmann, 1982:39).
The important question is whether it is possible
to introduce a "give-a-little, get-a-little" model of
justice into a heterogeneous society marked by
sometimes deep, complex normative divisions and
conflicting interests. This is not to suggest that
such a model cannot be found in our society (Chambliss
and Seidman note the case' of business persons v.
customers whose patronage continues to be sought),
only that it is atypical. The issue is how to
encourage greater utilization of this style, an issue
rendered difficult since much more than a simple
matter of style is involved. If a humanistic system
is one in which differences are tolerated or resolved
in an atmosphere of compromise, how can we extend the
spirit of compromise (hence, "give-a-little,
get-a-little") into the settlement of matters
revolving about norm enforcement ("winner-takes-all")?
As Chambliss and Seidman note, in societies like our
own, where extensive role differentiation exists and
the number of norms increases accordingly, dispute
settlement becomes more complicated; consequently, a
"winner-takes-all" method may be necessary in order to
maintain the social fabric. If so, the very nature of
social relations may preclude realization of a
humanistic system of justice. Certainly we cannot
resolve the issue here, but perhaps it is the most
fundamental issue with which humanistic criminologists
must come to grips.
There are additional issues to be considered.
For criminology to truly serve human needs the current
definition of "doing criminology" as well as orthodox
definitions of crime and criminality must change.
This suggestion has multiple implications. First, as
we've seen, the dehumanizing positivistic approach
620
that emphasizes scientific causality is well suited to
promote conformity and validate the idea that humans
are automatons (Galliher and McCartney, 1973;
Pepinsky, 1982). This is reflected in orthodox
criminology's continuing preoccupation with reducing
criminality and increasing social control. Reflecting
those concerns too, is the tendency to invoke evermore
sophisticated examples of "pathological" elements --
be they biological, psychological/psychiatric, or
social -- as causative. Rarely, if ever, is there a
conscious reflection on and repudiation of the
intellectually vacuous proposition that "evil causes
evil." This is especially noticeable in the current
work of psychophysiologists and sociobiologists where
one finds the most up-to-the-minute expressions of
degeneration theory (Hahn, 1978). As an alternative,
and to promote the goals of a humanistic criminology,
there must be a conscious effort to amend the
apparently fruitless singular quest for scientific
causes in order to focus on how (rather than simply
why) people act as they do. That is, in the Weberian
sense of the term, what motivates people to respond in
particular ways; what is the nature of the
rationalizing behaviors people engage in to construct
and negotiate meaning in their respective situations?
Second, to everlastingly seek the antecedents of
behavior perpetuates the myth of dualism; the
traditional search for causes lends credence to the
notion of objective and essential human differences,
and affords that orientation a cloak of legitimacy
only science can provide. In their search for
scientific causes a la positivism, practitioners are
led to differentiate offenders from non-offenders and
deal with the former as "basically and thoroughly
different" from others. As Schur (1979:49) has noted,
it is a well rooted tradition in our society to think
of offenders as a "breed apart" but usually a "breed"
of lower order organisms.- While repugnant in
general, such a perspective is particularly
antithetical to a humanistic orientation resting on a
foundation of social causality (Quinney, 1970:6-7).
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Linked to this is the need to effect a model of
behavior that is faithful to the human condition, one
that stresses ". . . the human being as subject/actor
who. . . is an active, choosing responsible architect
of self" (Goodwin, 1983:223). Is it possible to
accurately describe and understand patterns of action
without linking them with people's intentions,
decisions and judgments? Can we have a criminology
that is faithful to the human condition if it ignores
the fact of human agency? Isn't it a bit
contradictory to portray humankind as interactional
organisms, while simultaneously pursuing allegedly
objective, deterministic causes? To effect a
humanistic criminology it is essential that human
consciousness and purpose as elements of explanation
replace the manipulation of variables with which
orthodoxy is so concerned (Gove, 1980:15-19).
Lastly, a word on the justice of administration.
There is little doubt that millions of Americans are
disenchanted with our system of justice. This
disenchantment rests on several grounds, including the
belief that the justice system is illsuited to assist
people in resolving the sorts of daily problems they
experience constantly in a consumption society. While
not limited to them, these problems often include
matters involving consumers and other relatively
powerless entities confronting the awesome power of
remote and impersonal corporations. Laura Nader
(1980) refers to these matters as "little injustices,"
a term that nicely (though, perhaps, unintentionally)
conveys the fact that the judicial system assigns
relatively less importance, time, energy, and
personnel to these problems than to others, and is
generally irrelevant to the needs and goals of
complainants. As such, that system is out of touch
with people's needs and sense of justice. In response
to their unmet needs the public in countless cases has
turned to a wide variety of extrajudicial sources for
relief, ranging from the Better Business Bureau and
local representatives of the media, to Ralph Nader's
Center for the Study of Responsive Law and the
Consumer Complaint Research Center. Members of the
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public are also taking direct action, including
establishing alternative extra-legal "courts" through
which they may obtain meaningful resolutions of their
legal problems. The point of this is that if justice
is to be humanized rather than merely made more
organizationally efficient, it seems necessary to
develop a wide range of alternatives to the existing
bureaucracy, including the use of lay judges (N.Y.
Times, 10/27/83:12), neighborhood courts 10and other
innovative conflict-resolving mechanisms. Despite
the apparent interest in, need for, and history of
such innovative alternatives, critics persist in
maintaining that such unorthodox programs "have no
place in a fair, modern judicial system" (N.Y. Times,
10/27/83:12). It goes without saying that such
critics often represent the interests of the
established court system and the legal profession, and
oppose the creation of a more responsive and
humanistically oriented justice system.
CONCLUSION
Let me bring this to a close. I have focused on
several features of the criminological enterprise that
I believe identify it as decidely non-humanistic. In
taking this position, I recognize that the enterprise
is a "mixed bag" as befits a pluralistic society and
that within the larger enterprise, one finds point and
counterpoint. While acknowledging that, I submit that
the dominant orientation is away from humanism.
We are presently establishing and effectively
rationalizing neo-classicism, an orientation that
serves to rationalize a public policy aimed at
controlling crime in the name of social defense
(Ancel, 1965; Wilson, 1975, 1983; Greenwood, 1982 and
1984). Call it deterrence or selective incapacitation
(euphemisms, to be sure), the current tendency
reflects the same intellectual orientation that gave
us sex psychopath laws and habitual offender laws
(Jeffery, 1972:481). Consistent with that,
legislatures are straining every fiber and turning
every rock in search of funds to finance the
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construction of more and larger prisons to house
growing inmate populations for ever longer periods
(N.Y. Times, 9/29/83:11). Reflecting similar
tendencies, Chief Justice Warren Burger, with no
apparent awareness of the inherent contradiction, has
lent the authority of his office to legitimating
vengeance and retribution in the name of achieving
community solidarity and forestalling "mass neurosis"
(Arizona Republic, 10/21/83:A-1). And this is a time
when fundamental principles such as the prohibition
against granting police power to the military is being
reversed in the name of fighting crime (Arizona
Republic, 1/16/82:A-20). The examples, all reflecting
a non-humanistic orientation, seem endless.
Further, I have suggested a variety of conditions
that must be dealt with if humanism is ever to be more
than a tolerated, but largely irrelevant, orientation.
These suggested conditions, when viewed in context,
lead me to contend that existing crime control
policies (and their legitimating ideology) reflect the
kind of social organization we have created. These
elements are in harmony. Ours is a crime control
policy that focuses rather exclusively on restraining
offenders rather than on more humanistic matters such
as creating conformity (Michalowski, 1985:51), healing
social wounds and repairing the social fabric.
Current policy aspires to promote social control by
means of coercion (punishment or the threat of it)
rather than by seeking to institute social
arrangements leading to willful cooperation and
conformity. Given this condition, it is my sense that
the distinction between coercive restraint and willing
conformity is one that largely falls on deaf ears in
the criminological fraternity. The consciousness of
most criminologists obliges them to pursue knowledge
concerning "criminal man" rather than the criminogenic
society. The result needs no further elaboration.
Stated most simply, I question whether it is possible
to change contemporary criminology without
transforming the social order from which it springs.
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Beyond that, I perceive a potentially more
ominous condition that may take us ever farther from a
course of institutionalized humanism, viz., the
erosion of freedom as a consequence of our entry into
the nuclear age, the threat of nuclear war, and the
need to guard against unauthorized access to
radioactive material (Az. Republic, 9/13/85). Linked
to this development is the emergence of the national
security state and a "...supporting set of values and
behaviors that are proving inimical to the practice of
democracy" (Hardert, et al, 1984:398). Of relevance
to our concern with criminology is that these "values
and behaviors" neatly compliment the post-1960's
expansion of proactive policing (including,
especially, the escalation of "sting" operations) and
a significant expansion of police use of agents
provocateur (Wise, 1976; Marx, 1974 and 1981). Thus,
the criminological enterprise currently exists in a
context that calls for greater and greater
surveillaie and control (and an appropriate official
apparatus ). In this effort, the humanizing arts are
increasingly subordinate to technological superiority
just as there is a diminution of the "democratic ethos
of liberty, equality and tolerance" (Hardert,
1984:399). I am aware of no change in society in the
direction of humanism that is at all comparable to the
foregoing.
Thus, not only does the criminologic tradition
lack strong humanistic inclinations, but at present we
seem to be exhibiting conditions and a consciousness
(a police state mentality) that are especially
anti-humanistic. Given these conditions and trends,
my answer to the question with which we began -- what
are the immediate future prospects of a humanistic
criminology? -- is that they are bleak, indeed. I am
of the opinion that our highly touted "open society"
is fast becoming "closed." As the bureaucratization
of society increases and the interstices between the
limits of institutional existence become smaller and
fewer in number, the opportunity for people to exist
without organizational restrictions declines apace;
organizational hegemony and humanism tend to be
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mutually exclusive. This seems especially true when
social control agencies assume preponderant influence.
NOTES
1. Two examples of how humanistic concerns receive
minimal (or, perhaps, distorted) expression in
policy are victim compensation and diversion. In
the former, compensation most often gets
expressed in dehumanized terms by placing a
monetary value on victim suffering. In the case
of juvenile justice diversion programs, a major
consequence has been a new and larger criminal
justice "net." Though intended to keep juveniles
out of the justice system, diversion programs
have been so preempted by police departments that
such efforts have led to the "...sour conclusion
that not only have the purposes of diversion been
perverted but, moreover, police power has been
extended over youths and types of behavior not
previously subject to control" (Lemert, 1981:43;
Empey, 1982:482).
2. "Radical" is used here in its etymological sense
of getting to the root of things. I suspect the
roots of many criminological problems lie in
what, in retrospect, seems to be the uncritical
(i.e., nonradical) way the problem of crime has
always been handled and studied.
3. It is worth noting that bureaucracies not only
generate rules and regulations governing their
own operations, but a cadre of rule enforcers as
well. More than simple rule enforcement is
involved, however. Existing in a larger
environment in which non-bureaucratic values,
definitions, ethics, etc., prevail, functionaries
are often tempted to ignore rules, do favors, or
otherwise operate outside the formal regulatory
boundaries of the agency. Thus, agency rules and
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their ethical antithesis set the stage for a new
layer of "criminality." On the one hand, the
price of loyalty to the agency is the sacrifice
of humanistic ethics. On the other hand,
adherence '- humanistic ethics is achieved at the
price of being labeled untrustworthy. In this
sense, the phenomenon of the "whistle blower" is
instructive. In any case, agency personnel often
find themselves pressured by operating in a "no
win" situation.
4. Texts included were: Hugh D. Barlow, 1984; Robert
L. Bonn, 1984; John Conklin, 1981; Charles
McCaghy, 1980; William B. Sanders, 1983; Larry J.
Siegel, 1983; Gresham M. Sykes, 1978; John F.
Galliher and James L. McCartney, 1977; Clayton A.
Hartjen, 1978; Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald
Cressey, 1978; Sue Titus Reid, 1981; Peter
Wickman and Phillip Whitten, 1980.
5. A recent departure from this is James Q. Wilson's
(1975, 1983) dismissal of the need to understand
the causes of crime as a precondition of
intelligent social policy.
6. As Irwin Deutscher (1973:106) notes, we have
reached the point when validity is not only less
important than reliability, but when it is
assumed to be a function of reliability. An
immediate example of this is the series of
articles published in leading sociology journals
dealing with the so-called "Werther effect" in
suicides (Phillips, 1974) and subsequent articles
by Phillips on the relation of violent behavior
and mass media (Phillips, 1977, 1978, 1979,
1980a, 1980b, 1982a, 1982b, 1983). Despite at
least two responses to Phillips' work (Kobbervig,
Inverarity and Lauderdale, 1982 and Altheide,
1981) showing its lack of theoretical foundation,
it was only recently that a rejoinder to
Phillips' work appeared giving it the extensive
criticism it deserved. Sadly, however, the
argument continues to revolve largely around
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methodological concerns (Baron and Reiss, 1985a
and 1985b; Phillips and Bollen, 1985) and ignores
the dehumanizing assumptions that inform
Phillips' work.
7. The most recent variation on this theme involves
acknowledging the widespread nature of
criminality while simultaneously focusing on the
"high rate offenders", a tactic resting on the
belief that "high rate offenders", who may or may
not be substantively different from others, can
be adequately (but not perfectly) identified
simply by examining their criminal history.
Those identified as "high rate offenders" are
then seen as candidates for selective
incapacitation. In any case, the distinction
between "high rate offenders", about whom we
ought to be concerned, and others who apparently
are not a serious threat, seems to be the latest
version of the old notion of the "dangerous
classes". (See: Greenwood, 1982 and 1984).
8. The tendency toward dogmatism is most often
hidden behind a facade of scientific and
intellectual dignity and impartiality. At times
our biases show through, however, as when radical
or critical criminology theory is captioned and
referred to categorically as "leftist" (see
Nettler, 1984:186ff). The capacity of such terms
to "poison the well" is too obvious to require
comment.
9. The instance leading to the qualifying "usually"
is white-collar crime.
10. Reference to the need for alternatives to
bureaucratic systems needs to be tempered by an
appreciation for the long-standing tendency for
people to resolve conflicts without recourse to
law and formal litigation. For commentary on
this practice, see: Auerbach, 1983; N.Y. Times,
2/13/83.
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11. In this context I am reminded of news stories of
President Reagan's proposals for "anti-terrorist
legislation," allegedly based on the rationale
that terrorism poses an immediate threat to "our
way of life." And in my own state a cadre of
"anti-terrorist" police were trained to counter
anticipated terrorist activity during the 1984
summer Olympic games in Los Angeles. In addition
to the mentality leading to this type of effort
is the question of how these forces and laws will
be dismantled or rescinded and, once created,
whether they may not serve to "facilitate" the
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